Blog

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE–Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS, FBI, and DoD identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as HOPLIGHT. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

DHS, FBI, and DoD are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This report provides analysis of twenty malicious executable files. Sixteen of these files are proxy applications that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators. The proxies have the ability to generate fake TLS handshake sessions using valid public SSL certificates, disguising network connections with remote malicious actors. One file contains a public SSL certificate and the payload of the file appears to be encoded with a password or key. The remaining file does not contain any of the public SSL certificates, but attempts outbound connections and drops four files. The dropped files primarily contain IP addresses and SSL certificates.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see MAR-10135536-8.v3.stix.

Submitted Files (20)

05feed9762bc46b47a7dc5c469add9f163c16df4ddaafe81983a628da5714461 (23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB8855690…)

0608e411348905145a267a9beaf5cd3527f11f95c4afde4c45998f066f418571 (34E56056E5741F33D823859E77235E…)

084b21bc32ee19af98f85aee8204a148032ce7eabef668481b919195dd62b319 (170A55F7C0448F1741E60B01DCEC9C…)

12480585e08855109c5972e85d99cda7701fe992bc1754f1a0736f1eebcb004d (868036E102DF4CE414B0E6700825B3…)

1a01b8a4c505db70f9e199337ce7f497b3dd42f25ad06487e29385580bca3676 (07D2B057D2385A4CDF413E8D342305…)

2151c1977b4555a1761c12f151969f8e853e26c396fa1a7b74ccbaf3a48f4525 (5C3898AC7670DA30CF0B22075F3E8E…)

32ec329301aa4547b4ef4800159940feb950785f1ab68d85a14d363e0ff2bc11 (38FC56965DCCD18F39F8A945F6EBC4…)

4a74a9fd40b63218f7504f806fce71dffefc1b1d6ca4bbaadd720b6a89d47761 (42682D4A78FE5C2EDA988185A34463…)

4c372df691fc699552f81c3d3937729f1dde2a2393f36c92ccc2bd2a033a0818 (C5DC53A540ABE95E02008A04A0D56D…)

70034b33f59c6698403293cdc28676c7daa8c49031089efa6eefce41e22dccb3 (61E3571B8D9B2E9CCFADC3DDE10FB6…)

73dcb7639c1f81d3f7c4931d32787bdf07bd98550888c4b29b1058b2d5a7ca33 (3EDCE4D49A2F31B8BA9BAD0B8EF549…)

83228075a604e955d59edc760e4c4ed16eedabfc8f6ac291cf21b4fcbcd1f70a (3021B9EF74c&BDDF59656A035F94FD…)

8a1d57ee05d29a730864299376b830a7e127f089e500e148d96d0868b7c5b520 (5C0C1B4C3B1CFD455AC05ACE994AED…)

b05aae59b3c1d024b19c88448811debef1eada2f51761a5c41e70da3db7615a9 (2FF1688FE866EC2871169197F9D469…)

b9a26a569257fbe02c10d3735587f10ee58e4281dba43474dbdef4ace8ea7101 (2A791769AA73AC757F210F8546125B…)

c66ef8652e15b579b409170658c95d35cfd6231c7ce030b172692f911e7dcff8 (E4ED26D5E2A84CC5E48D285E4EA898…)

d77fdabe17cdba62a8e728cbe6c740e2c2e541072501f77988674e07a05dfb39 (F8D26F2B8DD2AC4889597E1F2FD1F2…)

ddea408e178f0412ae78ff5d5adf2439251f68cad4fd853ee466a3c74649642d (BE588CD29B9DC6F8CFC4D0AA5E5C79…)

f8f7720785f7e75bd6407ac2acd63f90ab6c2907d3619162dc41a8ffa40a5d03 (D2DA675A8ADFEF9D0C146154084FFF…)

fe43bc385b30796f5e2d94dfa720903c70e66bc91dfdcfb2f3986a1fea3fe8c5 (F315BE41D9765D69AD60F0B4D29E43…)

Additional Files (7)

44a93ea6e6796530bb3cf99555dfb3b1092ed8fb4336bb198ca15b2a21d32980 (None)

49757cf85657757704656c079785c072bbc233cab942418d99d1f63d43f28359 (rdpproto.dll)

70902623c9cd0cccc8513850072b70732d02c266c7b7e96d2d5b2ed4f5edc289 (udbcgiut.dat)

823d255d3dc8cbc402527072a9220e4c38655de1a3e55a465db28b55d3ac1bf8 (None)

96a296d224f285c67bee93c30f8a309157f0daa35dc5b87e410b78630a09cfc7 (MSDFMAPI.INI)

ba80cb0a08908782f4b6e88aa15e2d306b19bc93e79bd8770bf8be904fd1bd09 (None)

cd5ff67ff773cc60c98c35f9e9d514b597cbd148789547ba152ba67bfc0fec8f (UDPTrcSvc.dll)

IPs (23)

112.175.92.57

113.114.117.122

117.239.241.2

119.18.230.253

128.200.115.228

137.139.135.151

14.140.116.172

181.39.135.126

186.169.2.237

195.158.234.60

197.211.212.59

21.252.107.198

210.137.6.37

217.117.4.110

218.255.24.226

221.138.17.152

26.165.218.44

47.206.4.145

70.224.36.194

81.94.192.10

81.94.192.147

84.49.242.125

97.90.44.200

05feed9762bc46b47a7dc5c469add9f163c16df4ddaafe81983a628da5714461

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious 32-bit Windows executable. When executed the malware will collect system information about the victim machine including OS Version, Volume Information, and System Time, as well as enumerate the system drives and partitions.

The malware is capable of the following functions:

—Begin Malware Capability—

Read, Write, and Move Files
Enumerate System Drives
Create and Terminate Processes
Inject into Running Processes
Create, Start and Stop Services
Modify Registry Settings
Connect to a Remote Host
Upload and Download Files

—End Malware Capability—

The malware family has 2 versions. Both are nearly identical in functionality but use slightly different command codes. So if the opcode for Keepalive in version 1 is 0xB6C1, the opcode in version 2 will be 0xB6C2.

There may be some versions of the malware that have limited/additional functionality, but most will have these command codes:

—Begin Version 1 Command Codes—

0xB6A4 GetComputerlnfo
   -Gets OS Version
   -Opens and sends back multiple registry keys
       Keys are encrypted in actually binary using RC4 with 16 byte key (af 3d 78    23 4a 79 92 81 9d 7f 20 47 ad e3 f2 b3). Keys are decrypted prior to calling RegOpenKey/RegQueryValue.
   -Calls GetSystemlnfo, returns results of a SYSTEM_INFO struct
   -Calls GetSystemMetrics and returns results
0xB6AS GetDriveslnfo
   -Gets info about different drives/share drives on system as well as memory available/memory used on those drives
0xB6A6 Directorylist
   -Gives list of all files in a directory that is specified by the C2
0xB6A7 SendFile
   -Sends a file from the victim machine to the C2 that is specified by the C2
0xB6A8 ReceiveFile
   -Victim machine receives file from the C2
0xB6A9 CreateProcess
   -Calls CreateProcessW to run a process via the command line. C2 specifies the path of the file to be run via command line.
0xB6AA EnableLogging
   -Prior to victim and C2 closing out a connection the victim will spawn a new thread that will compile a comprehensive log of system/session information. Inside this thread it opens a file that is named randomly and places it in the temp directory. It puts all the log results into this file.
0xB6AB Deletefile
   -Deletes file specified by the C2.
0xB6AC RunCmdPipe
   -Runs CreateProcessW to run a process via the command line. The process will be cmd.exe and the arguments will be the windows cmd command that the C2 specifies. The results of this command will be sent to a temporary file and then read back to the C2 from that file. Afterwards that file is deleted.
0xB6AD Processlist
   -Gets a list of processes
0xB6AE KillProcess
   -Kills process based on the PID that the C2 supplies.
0xB6AF TestEncryption
   -Tests LFSR encryption, no real functionality
0xB6B0 Uninstall
   -Uninstalls the implant from the victim box
0xB6B2 GetConfig
   -Gets the current callback config file from memory, returns the list to C2. There are 10 IP options in this config.
0xB6B3 SetConfig
   -Gets the current callback config file from memory, allows C2 to change the configurations. This will change the beacon IP to whatever the C2 wants.
0xB6B4 SetCurrentDirectory
   -Changes current working directory to the path supplied by C2
0xB6B5 GetCurrentDirectory
   -Gets the current working directory and returns it to the C2
0xB6C1 KeepAlive
   -C2s sends this as a keep alive to the victim, victim responds with confirmation    that it received the keep alive and keeps session open

—End Version 1 Command Codes—

The malware is capable of opening and binding to a socket. The malware uses a public SSL certificate for secure communication. This certificate is from www.naver.com. Naver.com is the largest search engine in Korea and provides a variety of web services to clients around the world.

The malware uses the default certificates/private keys that come with PolarSSL. These are generally used for testing purposes only. Additionally the C2 IPs that act as the server for the TLS handshake require the malware to respond back with a client key. This key is also a default key found within the PolarSSL libraries.

—Begin SSL Certificate Header—

1 0     UNL10U
PolarSSL10UPolarSSL Test CA0
110212144407Z
2102121144407Z0<1 0 UNL10U
PolarSSL10UPolarSSL Client 200

—End SSL Certificate Header—

When executed, the malware will attempt a TLS Handshake with one of four hardcoded IP addresses embedded in the malware. These IP addresses are referenced in ‘udbcgiut.dat’ below. The malware also contains an embedded Zlib compression library that appears to further obfuscate the communications payload.

After the TLS authentication is completed this particular malware does NOT use the session key that is generated via TLS. It uses a custom Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) encryption scheme to encrypt all communications after the completion of the handshake. A python script to decrypt traffic is given below:

—Begin LFSR Decryption Script—

class lfsr:
   def _init_(self):
       self.b = (0, 0, 0, 0)
       self.data = b”
       self.L= 0

   def lfsr_init(self, data):
       self.L = len(data)
       self.data = data
       self.b[0] = 0
       self.b[1] = 0xc2b45678
       self.b[2] = 0x90abcdef
       self.b[3] = 0xfe268455

   for i in range(int(self.L / 3)):
       self.b[1] ^= self.b[2]
       self.b[2] ^= self.b[3]
       self.b[3] ^= self.b[1]

   for i in range{self.L % 3):
       self.b[1] |= self.b[2]
       self.b[2] |= self.b[3]
       self.b[3] |= self.b[1]

    def lfsr_1(self):
       r = 0
       if (self.b[1] & 0x200) == 0x200:
           r += 1
       if (self.b[2] & 0x800) == 0x800:
           r += 1
       if (self.b[3] & 0x800) == 0x800:
           r += 1
       if r <= 1:
           self.b[0] = 1
       else:
           self.b[0] = 0

   def lfsr_2(self):
       v1 = self.b[1]
       r = (self.b[1] >> 9) & 1
       v3 = r == self.b[0]
       self.b[0] ^= r
       if not v3:
           r = (v1 ^ ((v1 ^ (( v1 ^ (v1 >> 1)) >> 1)) >> 3)) >> 13
           v4 = 2 * (v1 & 0x3ffff)
           self.b[1] = v4
           if (r & 1):
               self.b[1] = v4 ^ 1

   def lfsr_3(self):
       v1 = self.b[2]
       r = (self.b[2] >> 11) & 1
       v3 = r == self.b[0]
       self.b[0] ^= r
       if not v3:
           r = (v1 ^ ((v1 ^ ((v1 ^ (v1 >> 1)) >> 4)) >> 4)) >> 12
           v4 = 2 * (v1 & 0x1fffff)
           self.b[2] = v4
           if (r & 1):
               self.b[2] = v4 ^ 1

   def lfsr 4(self):
       v1 = self.b[3]
       r = (self.b[3] >> 11) & 1
       v3 = r == self.b[0]
       self.b[0] ^= r
       if not v3:
           r = (v1 ^ ((v1 ^ ((v1 ^ (v1 >> 1)) >> 3)) >> 1)) >> 17
           v4 = 2 * (v1 & 0x3fffff)
           self.b[3] = v4
           if (r & 1):
               self.b[3] = v4 ^ 1

   def lfsr_genKeyByte(self):
       self.lfsr_1()
       self.lfsr_2()
       self.lfsr_3()
       self.lfsr_4()
       v2 = self.b[1] ^ self.b[2] ^ self.b[3]
       r = (v2 >> 0x18) ^ (v2 >> 0x10) ^ (v2 >> 0x8) ^ v2
       r &= 0xff
       return r

   def crypt(self):
       r= b”
       for i in range(len(self.data)):
           k = self.lfsr_genKeyByte()
           r += bytes([self.data[i] ^ k])
       return r

—End LFSR Decryption Script—

The following notable strings have been linked to the use of the SSL certificates and can be used to identify the malware:

—Begin Notable Strings—

fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn
ofuierfsdkljffjoiejftyuir
reykfgkodfgkfdskgdfogpdokgsdfpg
ztretrtireotreotieroptkierert
etudjfirejer
yrty
uiyy
uiyiyj lildvucv
erfdfe poiiumwq

—End Notable Strings—

The next four artifacts contain identical characteristics as those described above. Therefore, only capability that is unique will be described for the following four artifacts.

2151c1977b4555a1761c12f151969f8e853e26c396fa1a7b74ccbaf3a48f4525

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When this artifact is executed, it will write the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’ to C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp.

The malware will then attempt outbound SSL connections to 81.94.192.147 and 112.175.92.57. Both connection attempts are over TCP Port 443.
The two IP addresses above, as well as the IP addresses 181.39.135.126 and 197.211.212.59 are hard-coded into the malware. However, only connections to the first two IP addresses were attempted during analysis.

197.211.212.59

Ports

Whois

inetnum:        197.211.208.0 – 197.211.215.255
netname:        ZOL-16e-MOBILE-CUSTOMERS
descr:         ZOL Customers on ZTE Mobile WiMAX Platform
country:        ZW
admin-c:        BS10-AFRINIC
admin-c:        GJ1-AFRINIC
admin-c:        JHM1-AFRINIC
tech-c:         BS10-AFRINIC
tech-c:         GJ1-AFRINIC
tech-c:         JHM1-AFRINIC
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         LIQUID-TOL-MNT
source:         AFRINIC # Filtered
parent:         197.211.192.0 – 197.211.255.255

person:         B Siwela
address:        3rd Floor Greenbridge South
address:        Eastgate Center
address:        R. Mugabe Road
address:        Harare
address:        Zimbabwe
phone:         +263774673452
fax-no:         +2634702375
nic-hdl:        BS10-AFRINIC
mnt-by:         GENERATED-DVCNVXWBH3VN3XZXTRPHOT0OJ77GUNN3-MNT
source:         AFRINIC # Filtered

person:         G Jaya
address:        3rd Floor Greenbridge South
address:        Eastgate Center
address:        R. Mugabe Road
address:        Harare
address:        Zimbabwe
phone:         +263773373135
fax-no:         +2634702375
nic-hdl:        GJ1-AFRINIC
mnt-by:         GENERATED-QPEEUIPPW1WPRZ5HLHRXAVHDOKWLC9UC-MNT
source:         AFRINIC # Filtered

person:         John H Mwangi
address:        Liquid Telecom Kenya
address:        P.O.Box 62499 – 00200
address:        Nairobi Kenya
address:        Nairobi, Kenya
address:        Kenya
phone:         + 254 20 556 755

Relationships

Description

This IP address is listed in the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’. Outbound SSL connection attempts are made to this IP by Malware2.exe, Malware3.exe, and Malware5.exe. The domain, zol-ad-bdc.zol.co.zw is associated with the IP address, however, no DNS query is made for the name.

181.39.135.126

Ports

Whois

inetnum:     181.39.135.120/29
status:     reallocated
owner:     Clientes Guayaquil
ownerid:     EC-CLGU1-LACNIC
responsible: Tomislav Topic
address:     Kennedy Norte Mz. 109 Solar 21, 5, Piso 2
address:     5934 – Guayaquil – GY
country:     EC
phone:     +593 4 2680555 [101]
owner-c:     SEL
tech-c:     SEL
abuse-c:     SEL
created:     20160720
changed:     20160720
inetnum-up: 181.39/16

nic-hdl:     SEL
person:     Carlos Montero
e-mail:     networking@TELCONET.EC
address:     Kennedy Norte MZ, 109, Solar 21
address:     59342 – Guayaquil –
country:     EC
phone:     +593 42680555 [4601]
created:     20021004
changed:     20170323

Relationships

Description

This IP address is listed in the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’. Outbound SSL connection attempts are made to this IP by Malware2.exe, Malware3.exe, and Malware5.exe. No domain is associated with the IP address.

112.175.92.57

Ports

Whois

inetnum:        112.160.0.0 – 112.191.255.255
netname:        KORNET
descr:         Korea Telecom
admin-c:        IM667-AP
tech-c:         IM667-AP
country:        KR
status:         ALLOCATED PORTABLE
mnt-by:         MNT-KRNIC-AP
mnt-irt:        IRT-KRNIC-KR
last-modified: 2017-02-03T02:21:58Z
source:         APNIC

irt:            IRT-KRNIC-KR
address:        Seocho-ro 398, Seocho-gu, Seoul, Korea
e-mail:         hostmaster@nic.or.kr
abuse-mailbox: hostmaster@nic.or.kr
admin-c:        IM574-AP
tech-c:         IM574-AP
auth:         # Filtered
mnt-by:         MNT-KRNIC-AP
last-modified: 2017-10-19T07:36:36Z
source:         APNIC

person:         IP Manager
address:        Gyeonggi-do Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si Buljeong-ro 90
country:        KR
phone:         +82-2-500-6630
e-mail:         kornet_ip@kt.com
nic-hdl:        IM667-AP
mnt-by:         MNT-KRNIC-AP
last-modified: 2017-03-28T06:37:04Z
source:         APNIC

Relationships

Description

This IP address is listed in the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’. Outbound SSL connection attempts are made to this IP by Malware2.exe, Malware3.exe, and Malware5.exe. The domain, mail.everzone.co.kr is associated with the IP address, however, no DNS query is made for the name.

81.94.192.147

Ports

Whois

inetnum:        81.94.192.0 – 81.94.192.255
netname:        IOMARTHOSTING
descr:         iomart Hosting Limited
country:        GB
admin-c:        RA1415-RIPE
tech-c:         RA1415-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
remarks:        ABUSE REPORTS: abuse@redstation.com
mnt-by:         REDSTATION-MNT
mnt-domains:    REDSTATION-MNT
mnt-routes:     REDSTATION-MNT
created:        2016-02-14T11:44:25Z
last-modified: 2016-02-14T11:44:25Z
source:         RIPE

role:         Redstation Admin Role
address:        Redstation Limited
address:        2 Frater Gate Business Park
address:        Aerodrome Road
address:        Gosport
address:        Hampshire
address:        PO13 0GW
address:        UNITED KINGDOM
abuse-mailbox: abuse@redstation.com
e-mail:         abuse@redstation.com
nic-hdl:        RA1415-RIPE
mnt-by:         REDSTATION-MNT
created:        2005-04-22T17:34:33Z
last-modified: 2017-05-02T09:47:13Z
source:         RIPE

% Information related to ‘81.94.192.0/24AS20860’

route:         81.94.192.0/24
descr:         Wayne Dalton – Redstation Ltd
origin:         AS20860
mnt-by:         GB10488-RIPE-MNT
created:        2015-11-03T12:58:00Z
last-modified: 2015-11-03T12:58:00Z
source:         RIPE

Relationships

Description

This IP address is listed in the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’. Outbound SSL connection attempts are made to this IP by Malware2.exe, Malware3.exe, and Malware5.exe. No domain is associated with the IP address.

70902623c9cd0cccc8513850072b70732d02c266c7b7e96d2d5b2ed4f5edc289

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

‘udbcgiut.dat’ is dropped by three of the four PE32 executables. This file contains a 32byte unicode string uniquely generated for the infected system, as well as four socket pairs in hexidecimal.

—Begin Decoded Socket Pairs—

197.211.212.59:443
181.39.135.126:443
112.175.92.57:7443
81.94.192.147:7443

—End Decoded Socket Pairs—

The unicode string generated during this analysis was ‘8a9b11762b96c4b6’. The socket pairs remain the same for all instances of the malware.
For the PE32 executables, ‘udbcgiut.dat’ was dropped in the victim’s profile at %AppData%\Local\Temp. For the 64bit executables, ‘udbcgiut.dat’ was dropped in C:\Windows.

4c372df691fc699552f81c3d3937729f1dde2a2393f36c92ccc2bd2a033a0818

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

This artifact appears to be named ‘lamp.exe’. The malware contains the following debug pathway:

—Begin Debug Pathway—

Z:\Develop\41.LampExe\Release\LampExe.pdb

—End Debug Pathway—

ddea408e178f0412ae78ff5d5adf2439251f68cad4fd853ee466a3c74649642d

Tags

adwaretrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

This program attempts to initiate a TLS Handshake to the four IP/Port pairs listed in ‘udbcgiut.dat’. If the program is unable to establish a connection, the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’ is deleted.

After ‘udbcgiut.dat’ is deleted, an outbound SSL connection is made to 81.94.192.10. The IP address is hard coded in the malware and are not randomly generated.

This artifact also loads several APIs that are commonly associated with Pass-The-Hash (PTH) toolkits, indicating a capability to harvest user credentials and passwords.

—Begin Common PTH APIs—

SamiChangePasswordUser
SamFreeMemory
SamCloseHandle
SamOpenUser
SamLookupNamesInDomain
SamOpenDomain
SamConnect

—End Common PTH APIs—

81.94.192.10

Whois

Domain name:
       redstation.net.uk

   Registrant:
       Redstation Limited

   Registrant type:
       UK Limited Company, (Company number: 3590745)

   Registrant’s address:
       2 Frater Gate Business Park
       Aerodrome Road
       Gosport
       Hampshire
       PO13 0GW
       United Kingdom

   Data validation:
       Nominet was able to match the registrant’s name and address against a 3rd party data source on 21-Feb-2017

   Registrar:
       Easyspace Ltd [Tag = EASYSPACE]
       URL: https://www.easyspace.com/domain-names/extensions/uk

   Relevant dates:
       Registered on: 11-Apr-2005
       Expiry date: 11-Apr-2019
       Last updated: 12-Apr-2017

   Registration status:
       Registered until expiry date.

   Name servers:
       ns1.redstation.com
       ns2.redstation.com

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware5.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

12480585e08855109c5972e85d99cda7701fe992bc1754f1a0736f1eebcb004d

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious x64 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

In addition to the capabilities described above, this variant will hook the Windows Local Security Authority (lsass.exe). ‘lsass.exe’ will check the registry for the data value ‘rdpproto’ under the key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Name: Security Packages. If not found, this value is added by ‘lsass.exe’.
Next, the malware will drop the embedded file, ‘rdpproto.dll’ into the %System32% directory.
The file, ‘udbcgiut.dat’ is then written to C:\Windows. Outbound connection attempts are made to the socket pairs found within this file as described above.

49757cf85657757704656c079785c072bbc233cab942418d99d1f63d43f28359

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

“rdpproto.dll” is dropped into the %System32% directory by 868036E102DF4CE414B0E6700825B319. When the library is loaded,
“rdpproto.dll” will attempt to send SSL Client Hello packets to any of the following embedded IP addresses:

—Begin Embedded IP Addresses—

21.252.107.198
70.224.36.194
113.114.117.122
47.206.4.145
84.49.242.125
26.165.218.44
137.139.135.151
97.90.44.200
128.200.115.228
186.169.2.237

—End Embedded IP Addresses—

This artifact contains the following notable strings:

—Begin Notable Strings—

CompanyName
Adobe System Incorporated
FileDescription
MicrosoftWindows TransFilter/FilterType : 01 WindowsNT Service
FileVersion
6.1 Build 7601
InternalName
TCP/IP Packet Filter Service
LegalCopyright
Copyright 2015 – Adobe System Incorporated
LegalTrademarks
OriginalFileName
TCP/IP – PacketFilter

—End Notable Strings—

21.252.107.198

Ports

Whois

NetRange:     21.0.0.0 – 21.255.255.255
CIDR:         21.0.0.0/8
NetName:        DNIC-SNET-021
NetHandle:     NET-21-0-0-0-1
Parent:         ()
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:    
Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC)
RegDate:        1991-06-30
Updated:        2009-06-19
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-21-0-0-0-1

OrgName:        DoD Network Information Center
OrgId:         DNIC
Address:        3990 E. Broad Street
City:         Columbus
StateProv:     OH
PostalCode:     43218
Country:        US
RegDate:        
Updated:        2011-08-17
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

70.224.36.194

Ports

Whois

Domain Name: AMERITECH.NET
Registry Domain ID: 81816_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.corporatedomains.com
Registrar URL: http://www.cscglobal.com/global/web/csc/digital-brand-services.html
Updated Date: 2017-06-09T05:27:34Z
Creation Date: 1996-06-14T04:00:00Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-06-13T04:00:00Z
Registrar: CSC Corporate Domains, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 299
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domainabuse@cscglobal.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 8887802723
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: NS1.ATTDNS.COM
Name Server: NS2.ATTDNS.COM
Name Server: NS3.ATTDNS.COM
Name Server: NS4.ATTDNS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: ameritech.net
Registry Domain ID: 81816_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.corporatedomains.com
Registrar URL: www.cscprotectsbrands.com
Updated Date: 2017-06-09T05:27:34Z
Creation Date: 1996-06-14T04:00:00Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-06-13T04:00:00Z
Registrar: CSC CORPORATE DOMAINS, INC.
Registrar IANA ID: 299
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domainabuse@cscglobal.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.8887802723
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: Domain Administrator
Registrant Organization: AT&T SERVICES, INC.
Registrant Street: 801 Chestnut Street
Registrant City: Saint Louis
Registrant State/Province: MO
Registrant Postal Code: 63101
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.3142358168
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: +1.3142358168
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: att-domains@att.com
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: Domain Administrator
Admin Organization: AT&T SERVICES, INC.
Admin Street: 801 Chestnut Street
Admin City: Saint Louis
Admin State/Province: MO
Admin Postal Code: 63101
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.3142358168
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: +1.3142358168
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: att-domains@att.com
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: Domain Administrator
Tech Organization: AT&T SERVICES, INC.
Tech Street: 801 Chestnut Street
Tech City: Saint Louis
Tech State/Province: MO
Tech Postal Code: 63101
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.3142358168
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: +1.3142358168
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: att-domains@att.com
Name Server: ns3.attdns.com
Name Server: ns1.attdns.com
Name Server: ns2.attdns.com
Name Server: ns4.attdns.com
DNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

113.114.117.122

Ports

Whois

inetnum:        113.112.0.0 – 113.119.255.255
netname:        CHINANET-GD
descr:         CHINANET Guangdong province network
descr:         Data Communication Division
descr:         China Telecom
country:        CN
admin-c:        CH93-AP
tech-c:         IC83-AP
remarks:        service provider
status:         ALLOCATED PORTABLE
mnt-by:         APNIC-HM
mnt-lower:     MAINT-CHINANET-GD
mnt-routes:     MAINT-CHINANET-GD
last-modified: 2016-05-04T00:15:17Z
source:         APNIC
mnt-irt:        IRT-CHINANET-CN

irt:            IRT-CHINANET-CN
address:        No.31 ,jingrong street,beijing
address:        100032
e-mail:         anti-spam@ns.chinanet.cn.net
abuse-mailbox: anti-spam@ns.chinanet.cn.net
admin-c:        CH93-AP
tech-c:         CH93-AP
auth:         # Filtered
mnt-by:         MAINT-CHINANET
last-modified: 2010-11-15T00:31:55Z
source:         APNIC

person:         Chinanet Hostmaster
nic-hdl:        CH93-AP
e-mail:         anti-spam@ns.chinanet.cn.net
address:        No.31 ,jingrong street,beijing
address:        100032
phone:         +86-10-58501724
fax-no:         +86-10-58501724
country:        CN
mnt-by:         MAINT-CHINANET
last-modified: 2014-02-27T03:37:38Z
source:         APNIC

person:         IPMASTER CHINANET-GD
nic-hdl:        IC83-AP
e-mail:         gdnoc_HLWI@189.cn
address:        NO.18,RO. ZHONGSHANER,YUEXIU DISTRIC,GUANGZHOU
phone:         +86-20-87189274
fax-no:         +86-20-87189274
country:        CN
mnt-by:         MAINT-CHINANET-GD
remarks:        IPMASTER is not for spam complaint,please send spam complaint to abuse_gdnoc@189.cn
abuse-mailbox: antispam_gdnoc@189.cn
last-modified: 2014-09-22T04:41:26Z
source:         APNIC

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

47.206.4.145

Ports

Whois

Domain Name: FRONTIERNET.NET
Registry Domain ID: 4305589_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.register.com
Registrar URL: http://www.register.com
Updated Date: 2017-09-14T07:53:05Z
Creation Date: 1995-10-14T04:00:00Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-10-13T04:00:00Z
Registrar: Register.com, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 9
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@web.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.8003337680
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: AUTH.DLLS.PA.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.LKVL.MN.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.ROCH.NY.FRONTIERNET.NET
DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: FRONTIERNET.NET
Registry Domain ID: 4305589_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.register.com
Registrar URL: www.register.com
Updated Date: 2017-09-14T00:53:05.00Z
Creation Date: 1995-10-14T04:00:00.00Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-10-13T04:00:00.00Z
Registrar: REGISTER.COM, INC.
Registrar IANA ID: 9
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: FRONTIERNET HOSTMASTER
Registrant Organization:
Registrant Street: 95 N. FITZHUGH ST.
Registrant City: ROCHESTER
Registrant State/Province: NY
Registrant Postal Code: 14614-1212
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.8664747662
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: HOSTMASTER@FRONTIERNET.NET
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: FRONTIERNET HOSTMASTER
Admin Organization:
Admin Street: 95 N. FITZHUGH ST.
Admin City: ROCHESTER
Admin State/Province: NY
Admin Postal Code: 14614-1212
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.8664747662
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax:
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: HOSTMASTER@FRONTIERNET.NET
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: FRONTIERNET HOSTMASTER
Tech Organization:
Tech Street: 95 N. FITZHUGH ST.
Tech City: ROCHESTER
Tech State/Province: NY
Tech Postal Code: 14614-1212
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.8664747662
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax:
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: HOSTMASTER@FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.DLLS.PA.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.LKVL.MN.FRONTIERNET.NET
Name Server: AUTH.ROCH.NY.FRONTIERNET.NET
DNSSEC: unSigned

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

84.49.242.125

Ports

Whois

Domain Name: NEXTGENTEL.COM
Registry Domain ID: 13395561_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.domaininfo.com
Registrar URL: http://www.ports.domains
Updated Date: 2017-11-10T23:44:50Z
Creation Date: 1999-11-17T15:47:51Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-11-17T15:47:51Z
Registrar: Ports Group AB
Registrar IANA ID: 73
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@portsgroup.se
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +46.707260017
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: ANYADNS1.NEXTGENTEL.NET
Name Server: ANYADNS2.NEXTGENTEL.NET
DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: nextgentel.com
Registry Domain ID: 13395561_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.domaininfo.com
Registrar URL: ports.domains
Updated Date: 2017-11-10T23:44:50Z
Creation Date: 1999-11-17T15:47:51Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-11-17T15:47:51Z
Registrar: PortsGroup AB
Registrar IANA ID: 73
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@portsgroup.se
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +46.317202000
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: Hostmaster
Registrant Organization: NextGenTel AS
Registrant Street: Sandslimarka 31
Registrant City: SANDSLI
Registrant State/Province:
Registrant Postal Code: 5254
Registrant Country: NO
Registrant Phone: +47.55527900
Registrant Fax: +47.55527910
Registrant Email: hostmaster@nextgentel.com
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: Hostmaster
Admin Organization: NextGenTel AS
Admin Street: Sandslimarka 31
Admin City: Sandsli
Admin State/Province:
Admin Postal Code: 5254
Admin Country: NO
Admin Phone: +47.55527900
Admin Fax: +47.55527910
Admin Email: hostmaster@nextgentel.com
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: Hostmaster v/ Eivind Olsen
Tech Organization: NextGenTel AS
Tech Street: Postboks 3 Sandsli
Tech City: Bergen
Tech State/Province:
Tech Postal Code: 5861
Tech Country: NO
Tech Phone: +47.41649322
Tech Fax: +47.55527910
Tech Email: hostmaster@nextgentel.com
Name Server: ANYADNS1.NEXTGENTEL.NET
Name Server: ANYADNS2.NEXTGENTEL.NET
DNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

26.165.218.44

Ports

Whois

NetRange:     26.0.0.0 – 26.255.255.255
CIDR:         26.0.0.0/8
NetName:        DISANET26
NetHandle:     NET-26-0-0-0-1
Parent:         ()
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:    
Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC)
RegDate:        1995-04-30
Updated:        2009-06-19
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-26-0-0-0-1

OrgName:        DoD Network Information Center
OrgId:         DNIC
Address:        3990 E. Broad Street
City:         Columbus
StateProv:     OH
PostalCode:     43218
Country:        US
RegDate:        
Updated:        2011-08-17
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC

OrgTechHandle: MIL-HSTMST-ARIN
OrgTechName: Network DoD
OrgTechPhone: +1-844-347-2457
OrgTechEmail: disa.columbus.ns.mbx.hostmaster-dod-nic@mail.mil
OrgTechRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/MIL-HSTMST-ARIN

OrgAbuseHandle: REGIS10-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Registration
OrgAbusePhone: +1-844-347-2457
OrgAbuseEmail: disa.columbus.ns.mbx.arin-registrations@mail.mil
OrgAbuseRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/REGIS10-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: REGIS10-ARIN
OrgTechName: Registration
OrgTechPhone: +1-844-347-2457
OrgTechEmail: disa.columbus.ns.mbx.arin-registrations@mail.mil
OrgTechRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/REGIS10-ARIN

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

137.139.135.151

Ports

Whois

NetRange:     137.139.0.0 – 137.139.255.255
CIDR:         137.139.0.0/16
NetName:        SUC-OLDWEST
NetHandle:     NET-137-139-0-0-1
Parent:         NET137 (NET-137-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Assignment
OriginAS:    
Organization: SUNY College at Old Westbury (SCAOW)
RegDate:        1989-11-29
Updated:        2014-02-18
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-137-139-0-0-1

OrgName:        SUNY College at Old Westbury
OrgId:         SCAOW
Address:        223 Store Hill Road
City:         Old Westbury
StateProv:     NY
PostalCode:     11568
Country:        US
RegDate:        1989-11-29
Updated:        2011-09-24
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/SCAOW

OrgTechHandle: SUNYO-ARIN
OrgTechName: SUNYOWNOC
OrgTechPhone: +1-516-876-3379
OrgTechEmail: sunyownoc@oldwestbury.edu
OrgTechRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/SUNYO-ARIN

OrgAbuseHandle: SUNYO-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: SUNYOWNOC
OrgAbusePhone: +1-516-876-3379
OrgAbuseEmail: sunyownoc@oldwestbury.edu
OrgAbuseRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/SUNYO-ARIN

RAbuseHandle: SUNYO-ARIN
RAbuseName: SUNYOWNOC
RAbusePhone: +1-516-876-3379
RAbuseEmail: sunyownoc@oldwestbury.edu
RAbuseRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/SUNYO-ARIN

RTechHandle: SUNYO-ARIN
RTechName: SUNYOWNOC
RTechPhone: +1-516-876-3379
RTechEmail: sunyownoc@oldwestbury.edu
RTechRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/SUNYO-ARIN

RNOCHandle: SUNYO-ARIN
RNOCName: SUNYOWNOC
RNOCPhone: +1-516-876-3379
RNOCEmail: sunyownoc@oldwestbury.edu
RNOCRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/SUNYO-ARIN

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

97.90.44.200

Ports

Whois

Domain Name: CHARTER.COM
Registry Domain ID: 340223_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.markmonitor.com
Registrar URL: http://www.markmonitor.com
Updated Date: 2017-07-03T04:22:18Z
Creation Date: 1994-07-30T04:00:00Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2019-07-29T04:00:00Z
Registrar: MarkMonitor Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 292
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.2083895740
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Name Server: NS1.CHARTER.COM
Name Server: NS2.CHARTER.COM
Name Server: NS3.CHARTER.COM
Name Server: NS4.CHARTER.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned

Domain Name: charter.com
Registry Domain ID: 340223_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.markmonitor.com
Registrar URL: http://www.markmonitor.com
Updated Date: 2017-12-18T04:00:14-0800
Creation Date: 1994-07-29T21:00:00-0700
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2019-07-28T21:00:00-0700
Registrar: MarkMonitor, Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 292
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.2083895740
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited (https://www.icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited)
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited (https://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited)
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited (https://www.icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited)
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: Domain Admin
Registrant Organization: Charter Communications Operating, LLC
Registrant Street: 12405 Powerscourt Drive,
Registrant City: Saint Louis
Registrant State/Province: MO
Registrant Postal Code: 63131
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.3149650555
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: +1.9064010617
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: hostmaster@charter.com
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: Domain Admin
Admin Organization: Charter Communications Operating, LLC
Admin Street: 12405 Powerscourt Drive,
Admin City: Saint Louis
Admin State/Province: MO
Admin Postal Code: 63131
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +1.3149650555
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: +1.9064010617
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: hostmaster@charter.com
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: Charter Communications Internet Security and Abuse
Tech Organization: Charter Communications Operating, LLC
Tech Street: 12405 Powerscourt Drive,
Tech City: Saint Louis
Tech State/Province: MO
Tech Postal Code: 63131
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.3142883111
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: +1.3149090609
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: abuse@charter.net
Name Server: ns4.charter.com
Name Server: ns3.charter.com
Name Server: ns1.charter.com
Name Server: ns2.charter.com
DNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

128.200.115.228

Ports

Whois

Domain Name: UCI.EDU

Registrant:
University of California, Irvine
6366 Ayala Science Library
Irvine, CA 92697-1175
UNITED STATES

Administrative Contact:
Con Wieland
University of California, Irvine
Office of Information Technology
6366 Ayala Science Library
Irvine, CA 92697-1175
UNITED STATES
(949) 824-2222
oit-nsp@uci.edu

Technical Contact:
Con Wieland
University of California, Irvine
Office of Information Technology
6366 Ayala Science Library
Irvine, CA 92697-1175
UNITED STATES
(949) 824-2222
oit-nsp@uci.edu

Name Servers:
NS4.SERVICE.UCI.EDU     128.200.59.190
NS5.SERVICE.UCI.EDU     52.26.131.47

Domain record activated:    30-Sep-1985
Domain record last updated: 07-Jul-2016
Domain expires:             31-Jul-2018

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

186.169.2.237

Ports

Whois

inetnum:     186.168/15
status:     allocated
aut-num:     N/A
owner:     COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP
ownerid:     CO-CTSE-LACNIC
responsible: Administradores Internet
address:     Transversal 60, 114, A 55
address:     N – BOGOTA – Cu
country:     CO
phone:     +57 1 5339833 []
owner-c:     CTE7
tech-c:     CTE7
abuse-c:     CTE7
inetrev:     186.169/16
nserver:     DNS5.TELECOM.COM.CO
nsstat:     20171220 AA
nslastaa:    20171220
nserver:     DNS.TELECOM.COM.CO
nsstat:     20171220 AA
nslastaa:    20171220
created:     20110404
changed:     20141111

nic-hdl:     CTE7
person:     Grupo de Administradores Internet
e-mail:     admin.internet@TELECOM.COM.CO
address:     Transversal, 60, 114 A, 55
address:     571111 – BOGOTA DC – CU
country:     CO
phone:     +57 1 7050000 [71360]
created:     20140220
changed:     20140220

Relationships

Description

A high port to high port connection attempt is made to this IP address from ‘Malware2.dll’. No domain is associated with the IP address.

4a74a9fd40b63218f7504f806fce71dffefc1b1d6ca4bbaadd720b6a89d47761

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious 64bit Windows dynamic library called ‘Vote_Controller.dll’. The file shares similar functionality with ‘rdpproto.dll’ above, and attempts to connect to the same ten IP addresses.

42682D4A78FE5C2EDA988185A344637D also contains the same public SSL certificate as many of the artifacts above.

The file contains the following notable strings:

—Begin Notable Strings—

CompanyName
Kamsky Co, .Ltd
FileDescription
Vote_Controller
FileVersion
49, 0, 0, 0
InternalName
MDL_170329_x86_V06Lv3
LegalCopyright
Copyright
2017
LegalTrademarks
OriginalFileName
Vote_Controller
PrivateBuild
ProductName
Kamsky ColdFear
ProductVersion
17, 0, 0, 0

—End Notable Strings—

83228075a604e955d59edc760e4c4ed16eedabfc8f6ac291cf21b4fcbcd1f70a

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This artifact is 64bit Windows dynamic library file which shares many of the same characteristics and name (Vote_Controller.dll) as 42682D4A78FE5C2EDA988185A344637D above.

When this library is loaded it will look for the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’ in C:\WINDOWS. If ‘udbcgiut.dat’ is not found, the file will attempt connections to the same ten IP addresses described under ‘rdpproto.dll’ above.

One notable difference with this variant is that it uses the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) process to recompile the Managed Object Format (MOF) files in the WMI repository. At runtime, the malware will enumerate the drivers located in the registry at HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM.
These files are then recompiled by invoking wmiprvse.exe through svchost.exe: “C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -Embedding”.
MOF files are written in a SQL-like language and are run (compiled) by the operating system when a predetermined event takes place. Recent malware variants have been observed modifying the MOF files within the system registry to run specific commands and create persistency on the system.

Of note, the paravirtual SCSI driver for VMWare Tools is also located in HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM within a virtual image. When this driver is recompiled by the malware, VMWare Tools no longer works. It cannot be determined if this is an intentional characteristic of the malware to hinder analysis, or simply a symptom of the method used to establish persistence.

70034b33f59c6698403293cdc28676c7daa8c49031089efa6eefce41e22dccb3

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable. When executed, the artifact sets up the service, ‘Network UDP Trace Management Service’.
To set up the service, the program drops a dynamic library, ‘UDPTrcSvc.dll’ into the %System32% directory.
Next, the following registry keys are added:

—Begin Registry Keys—

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc Name: Type Value: 20
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc Name: Start Value: 02
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc Name: ImagePath Value: “%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k mdnetuse”
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc Name: DisplayName Value: “Network UDP Trace Management Service”
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc Name: ObjectName Value: “LocalSystem”
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\UDPTrcSvc\Parameters Name: ServiceDll Value: “%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k mdnetuse”
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\mdnetuse

—End Registry Keys—

The service is started by invoking svchost.exe.

After writing ‘UDPTrcSvd.dll’ to disk, the program drops two additional files. Similar to 5C3898AC7670DA30CF0B22075F3E8ED6 above, the program writes the file ‘udbcgiut.dat’ to the victim’s profile at %AppData/Local/Temp%. A second file is written to the victim’s profile in the %AppData/Local/VirtualStore/Windows% directory and identified as ‘MSDFMAPI.INI’. ‘MSDFMAPI.INI’ is also written to C:\WINDOWS. More information on the content of these files is below.

61E3571B8D9B2E9CCFADC3DDE10FB6E1 attempts the same outbound connections as 5C3898AC7670DA30CF0B22075F3E8ED6, however the file does not contain any of the public SSL certificates referenced above.

cd5ff67ff773cc60c98c35f9e9d514b597cbd148789547ba152ba67bfc0fec8f

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious 32bit Windows dynamic library. ‘UDPTrcSvc.dll’ is identified as the ‘Network UDP Trace Management Service’. The following description is provided:

—Begin Service Description—

Network UDP Trace Management Service Hosts TourSvc Tracing. If this service is stopped, notifications of network trace will no longer function and there might not be access to service functions. If this service is disabled, notifications of and monitoring to network state will no longer function.

—End Service Description—

The service is invoked with the command, ‘C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k mdnetuse’.
When the service is run a modification to the system firewall is attempted, ‘cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 0 “adp”‘.

Unlike many of the files listed above that use a public certificate from naver.com, ‘UDPTrcSvc.dll’ uses a public SSL certificate from google.com.

96a296d224f285c67bee93c30f8a309157f0daa35dc5b87e410b78630a09cfc7

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

Relationships

Description

‘MSDFMAPI.INI’ is written to C:\WINDOWS and to %UserProfile\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Windows%. During analysis, two NULL characters were written to the file. The purpose of the file has not been determined.

d77fdabe17cdba62a8e728cbe6c740e2c2e541072501f77988674e07a05dfb39

Tags

droppertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This artifact contains a similar public SSL certificate from naver.com, similar to many of the files above. The payload of the file appears to be encoded with a password or key. No context was provided with the file’s submission.

b9a26a569257fbe02c10d3735587f10ee58e4281dba43474dbdef4ace8ea7101

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

–Begin IP List–

117.239.241.2
218.255.24.226
195.158.234.60

–End IP List–

Client uses uk.yahoo.com for client hello server name instead of naver.com.
 

117.239.241.2

Relationships

218.255.24.226

Relationships

195.158.234.60

Relationships

1a01b8a4c505db70f9e199337ce7f497b3dd42f25ad06487e29385580bca3676

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious 64bit Windows dynamic library. When run the malware drops a Themida packed DLL. This DLL runs and drops another DLL that acts as the Remote admin tool. This RAT is very similar to version 2 in op codes and functionality however it uses real TLS instead of the LFSR encryption. Additionally it encodes it’s data with XOR Ox47 SUB Ox28 prior to being TLS encrypted.

73dcb7639c1f81d3f7c4931d32787bdf07bd98550888c4b29b1058b2d5a7ca33

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

This file is dropped by a different binary into System32 and then run as a service. When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

–Begin IP List–

192.168.1.2

–End IP List–

Client uses uk.yahoo.com for client hello server name instead of naver.com.

084b21bc32ee19af98f85aee8204a148032ce7eabef668481b919195dd62b319

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Description

This artifact is a malicious 64bit Windows dynamic library. The DLL can be run using the DoStart export. This export calls write file to load the actual implant into a file “C:\windows\msncone.exe” and then calls Win Exec to execute the implant.

c66ef8652e15b579b409170658c95d35cfd6231c7ce030b172692f911e7dcff8

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable that is an add-on tool for other Hoplight implants.

When malware is run it opens a log file C:\WINDOWS\Temp\ndb.dat that is used for the remainder of the program to log all activity.

The malware runs with an IP as an argument. It sends out a beacon to this IP and connects to it using the same FakeTLS/PolarSSL protocol as the other samples. After a successful connection to a C2, it uses a named pipe called \\\\.\\pipe\\AnonymousPipe to connect to a running implant and sends tasking to the running implant. The implant returns the results of these taskings over the named pipe and the malware sends the results back to the C2.

fe43bc385b30796f5e2d94dfa720903c70e66bc91dfdcfb2f3986a1fea3fe8c5

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

f8f7720785f7e75bd6407ac2acd63f90ab6c2907d3619162dc41a8ffa40a5d03

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

–Begin IP List–

10.10.30.130

–End IP List–

Client uses uk.yahoo.com for client hello server name instead of naver.com.

32ec329301aa4547b4ef4800159940feb950785f1ab68d85a14d363e0ff2bc11

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

–Begin IP List–

218.255.24.226

–End IP List–

Client uses www.bing.com. Microsoft.com, and facebook.com for client hello server name instead of naver.com.

8a1d57ee05d29a730864299376b830a7e127f089e500e148d96d0868b7c5b520

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

This file is dropped by a different binary into System32 and then run as a service. When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

–Begin IP List–

81.94.192.147
112.175.92.57
181.39.135.126
197.211.212.59

–End IP List–
 

0608e411348905145a267a9beaf5cd3527f11f95c4afde4c45998f066f418571

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

—Begin IP List—

14.140.116.172

—End IP List—

Client uses uk.yahoo.com for client hello server name instead of naver.com.

14.140.116.172

Relationships

Description

The file 34E56056E5741F33D823859E77235ED9 beacons to this hard coded IP.

b05aae59b3c1d024b19c88448811debef1eada2f51761a5c41e70da3db7615a9

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
• rule polarSSL_servernames
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $polarSSL = “fjiejffndxklfsdkfjsaadiepwn”
     $sn1 = “www.google.com”
     $sn2 = “www.naver.com”
  condition:
          (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) — 0x4550) and ($polarSSL and 1 of ($sn*))
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hard coded IPs:

—Begin IP List—

210.137.6.37
119.18.230.253
221.138.17.152

—End IP List—

Client uses naver.com for client hello server name.

119.18.230.253

Description

The file 2FF1688FE866EC2871169197F9D46936 beacons to this hard coded IP.

210.137.6.37

Description

The file 2FF1688FE866EC2871169197F9D46936 beacons to this hard coded IP.

221.138.17.152

Description

The file 2FF1688FE866EC2871169197F9D46936 beacons to this hard coded IP.

ba80cb0a08908782f4b6e88aa15e2d306b19bc93e79bd8770bf8be904fd1bd09

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

• rule crypt_constants_2
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }
•  
• rule lsfr_constants
  {
  meta:
     Author=”NCCIC trusted 3rd party”
     Incident=”10135536″
     Date = “2018/04/19”    
     category = “hidden_cobra”
     family = “n/a”
     description = “n/a”
  strings:
     $ = {efcdab90}
     $ = {558426fe}
     $ = {7856b4c2}
  condition:
     (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
  }

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This artifact is a malicious PE32 executable with similar characteristics of those described in 23E27E5482E3F55BF828DAB885569033 above.

When the malware runs it checks a config file to determine where it should beacon back to. If the config file has not been modified the malware will beacon back to the following hardcoded IPs.

–Begin Hardcoded IP–

117.239.241.2
217.117.4.110

–End Hardcoded IP–

217.117.4.110

Relationships

Description

The file ba80cb0a08908782f4b6e88aa15e2d306b19bc93e79bd8770bf8be904fd1bd09 beacons to this hardcoded IP.

44a93ea6e6796530bb3cf99555dfb3b1092ed8fb4336bb198ca15b2a21d32980

Tags

backdoordroppertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This executable must be run with argument 15975345682 to execute and then drops C:\Windows\system32\dispark.dll (E5D1C42E5CA7A0AC3A3B31BD0F290E84), a custom packed loader.

E5D1C42E5CA7A0AC3A3B31BD0F290E84 drops 535C879CA109DBECD336E1DE0ECCB696 that runs as a service.

823d255d3dc8cbc402527072a9220e4c38655de1a3e55a465db28b55d3ac1bf8

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Description

This executable must be run with argument 15975345682 to execute and then drops C:\Windows\system32\diskpart.dll (7AFF84FB44840E4FD53CC9561172E14B), a custom packed loader.

7AFF84FB44840E4FD53CC9561172E14B drops BD674814315892B937BC91A10783D140 that runs as a service.

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization’s systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users’ ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its “true file type” (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users’ web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops”.

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or soc@us-cert.gov.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA’s homepage at www.us-cert.gov.